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A LIBERAL JUDGE: CUTHBERT W. POUND
HENRY W. EDGERTON*
It would be interesting to discover the extent of the influence of
Judge Pound's judicial work upon the development of the law; but
little can be done in that direction. If a case in which he wrote the
opinion has been cited and "followed", it is a violent assumption that
the later decisions were due to the earlier one; it is in general quite
as good a guess that the conditions which produced it would have
produced them even if it had not occurred. But suppose it is assumed,
on however slight a basis, that the first decision did influence the law.
Still we do not know that Judge Pound influenced the law; for we
do not know that he influenced the decision of the case in which he
wrote the opinion, unless that case was decided by a bare majority of
the court. No doubt many cases to which Pound's name is attached
would have been decided as they were if he had never sat upon the
bench; just as, conversely, he doubtless influenced the court's judg-
ment in many cases in which he did not write the opinion. As the
writing of opinions in the Court of Appeals goes in rotation, it is
less likely than in some other courts that the judge who writes the
opinion happens to influence the decision. The influence of a case
depends largely on its argument and language, and these may be at-
tributed to the judge who wrote the opinion. But it is impossible to
apportion the influence which a case may be thought to possess, as
between the court and the decision on the one hand and the language
and its author on the other.
Qualifications have been suggested even upon the proposition that
a judicial opinion itself is the author's own. It has been suggested
that only a dissenting, or separately concurring, opinion truly repre-
sents its author, because in the case of a majority opinion "the de-
cision, and usually the language, must ordinarily be acceptable to the
entire bench for whom the judge writes."1 Dissents and separate
opinions are a small fraction of the judicial output even of a rugged
individual like Pound, and one who undertakes to discuss his judicial
writing can hardly ignore the opinions in which he spoke for the
court. He might have spoken differently if he bad not been engaged
in finding formulae upon which four or more men could agree; yet
*The author gratefully acknowledges the invaluable help of Mr. Robert S.
Pasley, Jr., one of the editors of the QUARTERLY, in the preparation of this article.
1Sanuel Klaus, review of MR. JUSTICE CARaozo. A LIBERAL MIND IN AcTIoN.
(1935) 35 COL. L. REv. 958.
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he may fairly be assumed to have meant what he said. What is cer-
tain is that by attaching his name to it he attached it to his name.
Pound talking for his colleagues is as much himself as Pound talking
for the lower court, the parties, or the public. One must talk for some
one. Moreover there is nothing to prevent a judge from using, in sup-
port of a result in which his colleagues concur, arguments in which
they do not concur. The entry, " , J., concurs in the result," is
familiar. And even in a separate or dissenting opinion, a judge some-
times talks primarily for his colleagues.
While no one can know the extent of the influence of Judge Pound's
judicial work, one may characterize its direction as liberal.
I. LIBERAL JUDGES
"A liberal judge" may mean various things. Mr. Pollard, in his
Mr. Justice Cardozo, A Liberal Mind in Action, appears to assume
that whatever Mr. Justice Cardozo judicially does is by hypothesis
"liberal". John Dewey, in writing on Justice Holmes and the Liberal
Mind,2 describes as the essence of Holmes's "liberal faith" a "belief
in the conclusions of intelligence as the finally directive force in life;
in freedom of thought and expression as a *condition needed in order
to realize this power of direction by thought, and in the experimental
character of life and thought." In practical terms this means tolerance
of change. As Holmes was a preeminent exponent of this kind of lib-
eralism, one applies to him the term liberal, whether or not one thinks
that he had also an effective sympathy with the underdog; but that
sort of sympathy is, I believe, a second characteristic of "a liberal
judge" as the term is commonly understood. These two characteristics
frequently reinforce each other and point toward the same judicial
decision; but one is irrelevant in some situations which engage the
other, and in some situations the two conflict. If one's liberalism stops
where John Dewey intimates that Holmes's did, one is as tolerant of
experiments in the third degree as of experiments in probation, of
increases in the concentration of income and leisure as of increases in
their diffusion, of exacerbations as of improvements in the relative
positions of workingmen, women, radicals, and foreigners. That was
not the case with Judge Pound. He was a liberal judge in the second
sense as well as in the first.
The opportunities of a liberal judge depend, of course, upon "The
Nature of the Judicial Process." Mr. Justice Cardozo, in his classic
book of that name, observes: "One of the most fundamental social
interests is that law shall be uniform and impartial. There must be
21n MR. JusTIcE HOLMES, ed. by Felix Frankfurter (1931) pp. 33, 34.
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nothing in its action that savors of prejudice or favor or even arbi-
trary whim or fitfulness. Therefore in the main there shall be ad-
herence to precedent. There shall be symmetrical development, con-
sistently with history or custom when history or custom has been the
motive force, or the chief one, in giving shape to existing rules, and
with logic or philosophy when the motive power has been theirs. But
symmetrical development may be bought at too high a price. Uni-
formity ceases to be a good when it becomes uniformity of oppres-
sion.13 "When the social needs demand one settlement rather than
another, there are times when we must bend symmetry, ignore his-
tory and sacrifice custom in the pursuit of other and larger ends."4
Conflicting social interests must be weighed and balanced. "If you
ask how he [a judge] is to know when one interest outweighs an-
other, I can only answer that he must get his knowledge just as the
legislator gets it, from experience and study and reflection; in brief,
from life itself. Here, indeed, is the point of contact between the legis-
lator's work and his. The choice of methods, the appraisement of
values, must in the end be guided by like considerations for the one
as for the other. Each indeed is legislating within the limits of his
competence. No doubt the limits for the judge are narrower. He
legislates only between gaps. He fills the open spaces in the law...
Even within the gaps, restrictions not easy to define, but felt, however
impalpable they may be, by every judge and lawyer, hedge and circum-
scribe his action. They are established by the traditions of the cen-
turies, by the example of other judges, his predecessors and his col-
leagues, by the collective judgment of the profession, and by the duty
of adherence to the pervading spirit of the law. . .None the less,
within the confines of these open spaces and those of precedent and
tradition, choice moves with a freedom which stamps its action as
creative. The law which is the resulting product is not found, but
made. The process, being legislative, demands the legislator's wis-
dom." 5
Liberal Judges and Change. Within the limits of the judicial proc-
ess, a liberal judge's tolerance of change has room to show itself fre-
quently with regard to judicial legislation and with regard to statutes.
Liberal judges, in common with enlightened judges of other lean-
ings, recognize that, as Justice Holmes expressed it, "general proposi-
tions do not decide concrete cases"; they reject "the old Blackstonian
theory of pre-existing rules of law which judges found, but did not
make." They are relatively immune to "the phenomenon known as
3CARD0ZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921) pp. 112-113.
41d. at 65. bId. at 113-115. 61d. at 131.
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the jurisprudence of conceptions, the method of rigidly defining cer-
tain legal conceptions in terms of legal experience of the past, and
expecting to decide future cases for all time by referring them to
these conceptions and applying to them rules definitely attached there-
to under quite distinct conditions and in other societies."'7 Unlike most
lawyers of the last century, and many lawyers of today, they do not
conceive "the judicial function to begin and end in applying to an
ascertained set of facts a rigidly defined legal formula definitely pre-
scribed as such or exactly deduced from authoritatively prescribed
premises."" So of the pseudo "historical" idea which has competed
with the analytical "jurisprudence of conceptions" for conventional
acceptance; the idea that "judicial decision ... must run of necessity
along historically fixed lines", and more specifically that it is marked
by an inevitable progress from status to contract, to a "maximum of
abstract individual free self-assertion."9 Liberal judges recognize that
within vague but large limits their decisions are compelled neither by
prior decisions nor by a supposed historical movement, and that with-
in these limits they can and must be guided by ideas of justice or of
social advantage. In discharging the legislative part of the judicial
function they act with somewhat more freedom than most judges, and
with far more consciousness of what they are about.
Justice Holmes once remarked: "When socialism first began to be
talked about, the comfortable classes of the community were a good
deal frightened. I suspect that this fear has influenced judicial action
both here and in England, yet it is certain that it is not a conscious
factor in the decisions to which I refer. I think that something similar
has led people who no longer hope to control the legislatures to look
to the courts as expounders of the Constitutions, and that in some
courts new principles have been discovered outside the bodies of those
instruments, which may be generalized into acceptance of the eco-
nomic doctrines which prevailed about fifty years ago, and a whole-
sale prohibition of what a tribunal of lawyers does not think about
right."'01 Liberal judges, on the other hand, recognize that no particu-
lar set of economic and social views is enshrined in constitutions and
superior to statutes; in Justice Holmes's phrase, that "The Four-
teenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social
Statics"." ''In judging the validity of statutes," says Justice Cardozo,
"the thing that counts is not what I believe to be right. It is what I
?Roscoe Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision (1923) 36 HA{v. L. REv. 817.
"Id. at 940.
91d. at 823, 821.
10HoLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS (1920) p. 184.
I'Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45, 75, 25 Sup. Ct. 539 (1905).
POUND: A LIBERAL JUDGE Ii
may reasonably believe that some other man of normal intellect and
conscience might reasonably look upon as right. 1 2 While judges
generally admit this as an abstract proposition, to act upon it under
stress is one of the marks of a liberal judge. It may be suggested that
a liberal judge is seldom subjected to the stress in question, as he is
likely to be in sympathy with legislation. It is true that he is frequent-
ly in sympathy with the legislation -which his conservative colleagues
reject; but the suggestion overlooks the fact that many statutes are
wholly unwelcome to liberals. It is as unusual for a liberal judge to
feel authorized to invalidate a statute which he dislikes as to feel
obliged to invalidate one which he likes.13
A liberal judge not only tends strongly to hold statutes constitu-
tional, but does not treat them as indiscretions to be minimized when
they cannot be ignored. He tends to interpret them more "liberally",
i. e., to attribute to them more meaning, than his conservative col-
leagues.
Tolerance toward the advocates of change is, of course, another
respect in which a liberal judge's tolerance of change manifests itself.
Liberal Judges and the Unprivileged. The characteristic of liberal
judges, or most of them, which I have loosely labeled sympathy with
the underdog, has many opportunities and varieties of expression.
Granted that law is frequently to be made, and that the social interest
or welfare is to be sought, the question remains, what is the social
interest? What is good for the goose may be very bad for the gander.
How are competing interests to be evaluated? To quote again from
Justice Cardozo: "Deep below consciousness are . .. the likes, and
the dislikes, the predilections and the prejudices, the complex of in-
stincts and emotions and habits and convictions, which make the man,
whether he be litigant or judge... The great tides and currents which
engulf the rest of men, do not turn aside in their course, and pass the
judges by.. . The decisions of the courts on economic and social ques-
tions depend upon their economic and social philosophy. . . In every
court there are likely to be as many estimates of the 'Zeitgeist' as
there are judges on its bench."' 4 To determine where the social in-
terest lies is to balance conflicting interests of individuals or groups.
Information and intelligence alone do not answer the question whether
peaceful picketing does more harm than good or vice versa; the an-
swer depends partly upon one's apprehension of facts and partly upon
"CARDOZO, op. dt. supra note 3, pp. 88-89.
""A striking illustration of Mr. Justice Holmes' deference to legislation with
which he has no sympathy appears in his dissent in Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U. S.
404, 412 (1923)." Felix Frankfurter, in MR. JusTIcE HOLMES (1931) p. 236.
"CARDOZO, Op. cit. supra note 3, PP. 167, 168, 171, 174.
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the relative strength of one's sympathies with union men, non-union
men, employers, and consumers; with recipients of small incomes and
large ones, of earned incomes and unearned ones. "Judges," as Judge
Learned Hand has said, "are usually taken from that part of the bar
which has distinguished itself in the field of action. They are likely
to be men of strong will, set beliefs and conventional ideals. They
are almost inevitably drawn from the propertied class and share its
assumptions."15 They "usually reflect the attitudes of their own in-
come class on social questions."1 6 True, there are multitudes of situa-
tions in which judges of all sorts, finding an applicable precedent or
principle or statute, do not feel free to enact something different and
more in accord with their ideas of social welfare. The point is that
there are other situations, more or less interstitial, in which no clearly
applicable precedent or principle or statute appears, or in which
judges "are called upon to say how far existing rules are to be ex-
tended or restricted"; they must then "let the welfare of society fix
the path, its direction and its distance."'17 To say that, in such situa-
tions, they usually reflect the attitudes of their own income class is
not to say that their views are determined consciously, or even un-
consciously, by their own interests; it is simply to say that the views
of most judges, like the views of the majority of any group, are those
of their environment. Most men are orthodox, otherwise orthodoxy
would be heterodoxy.
A liberal judge has a heterodox picture of a good society. When
he is called upon to determine where the balance of social advantage
lies, he allows less weight than is orthodox to the interests of the
propertied, enterprising, and employing classes, and more weight than
is orthodox to the interests of the propertyless and working classes.
He tends toward a similar heterodoxy at other points along the line
between the privileged and the unprivileged, by giving less weigh
than the orthodox judge to the intefests of conventional male Ameri
cans and more weight than he to the interests of women, radicals,
irregulars, foreigners, and criminals. There has been controversy as
to whether a judge should be governed, in his interstitial legislation,
by his own notions or by prevalent notions. Justice Cardozo has said,
"Let us suppose, for illustration, a judge who looked upon theatre-
going as a sin. Would he be doing right if, in a field where the rule of
law was still unsettled, he permitted this conviction, though known
to be in conflict with the dominant standard of right conduct, to gov-
'
5Mn. JusTICE HoLmEs (1931) ed. by Felix Frankfurter, p. 119.
16F. S. Cohen (1935) 35 COL. L. REv. at p. 845.
17 CARDozo, op. cit. supra note 3, p. 67.
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ern his decision? My own notion is that he would be under a duty to
conform to the accepted standards of the community, the mores of the
times."'I s This is persuasively put, but I venture to differ with Justice
Cardozo. Suppose that the judge who hates theatres is also a prohi-
bitionist, and that he is called on to determine an open and even ques-
tion in the law of wills, knowing that one answer will give a large
sum to the owners of a growing chain of theatres while the other
answer will give it to the W. C. T. U. If he is persuaded that "the
mores of the times" are favorable to theaters and unfavorable to pro-
hibition, should he put the money where it will do, as he believes,
the most harm? If a judge believes that labor unions are useful but
unpopular, should he decide open questions of labor law adversely
to them? In most situations we recognize that, within the limits per-
mitted by law, a man may commendably seek to further his own prin-
ciples, although he knows they are unpopular. If a writer or politician
or social worker or teacher may do so, why may not a judge? There
is no statute and no settled common-law principle that requires a
judge, within the interstitial area that we are considering, to prefer
prevalent views to his own. On the contrary, the idea that, in Pro-
fessor Gray's language, "he should follow his own notions,"'19 is prob-
ably more widely accepted. If that subjective theory prevails, most
judges will continue to vote the orthodox ticket because most judges
are orthodox, but the heterodox will be free to dissent. If Justice
Cardozo's objective theory prevails, the votes of the orthodox will not
be affected, but the heterodox will be admonished to join them in
voting the straight ticket. It is not apparent why the inevitable loading
of the dice in favor of orthodoxy should be thus increased. Most argu-
ments that are made for academic freedom may be made for judicial
freedom. It is favorable to variation and experiment, which are favor-
able to improvement. And it would be as stultifying for a judge as
for a teacher to be forbidden to further in his professional work any
but accepted opinions.
A minor but substantial difficulty with the objective position on
this point is the difficulty of determining what opinions are "ac-
cepted". His own notions a judge may know, but on most points there
are no statistics as to the conflicting notions of other people. Even
if one knew the opinions of every member of the community, problems
of evaluation would remain. Should the same or different weight be
given, in determining what is "accepted", to the views of young and
old, captains of industry and clerks, labor leaders and stevedores?
18M. p. lo8.
"
9 Quoted by CARDOZO, ibid.
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In any case, as Justice Cardozo points out, "The 'distinction be-
tween the subjective or individual'and the objective or general con-
science, in the field where the judge is not limited by established rules,
is shadowy and evanescent, and tends to become one of words and
little more... In the practical administration of justice, it will seldom
be decisive for the judge . . . The perception of objective right takes
the color of the subjective mind. The conclusiqns of the subjective
mind take the color of customary practices and objectified beliefs. '20
II. JUDGE POUND'S TOLERANCE OF CHANGE:
"Jurisprudence of conceptions." Both in terms and in effect, Pound
repudiated what is known as the jurisprudence of conceptions.
"Mechanical concepts of jurisprudence," he said, "make easy a de-
cision on the strength of seeming authority. '21 He constantly refused
to force facts into fixed categories. In a number of cases this refusal
protected the intentions of the makers of documents. In Lipedes v.
Liverpool & L. & G. Insurance Co.,22 a fire insurance policy stipu-
lated that it was to be void if the property "be or become incumbered
by a chattel mortgage". The question was whether the policy was
avoided by a subsequent mortgage which the court found to be void
for usury. Three judges held that a void mortgage was no mortgage,
and that the policy was valid. Pound, for the majority of the court,
held the contrary. "The question is whether the contract of the parties
contemplated the disclosure to the insurance company of the existence
of the usurious chattel mortgage."23 The mortgage "may, if enforce-
ment is resisted, lack legal efficacy, but it exists as a fact and has moral
efficacy . . . Property incumbered by a chattel mortgage may cease
to be a good moral risk. That the necessities or the ignorance of the
insured have forced him into the hands of the usurer does not make
the information sought a matter of indifference to the insurer, but
rather the contrary." 24 In Hartigan v. Casualty Co. of America,25
a company which had insured "A and B, Department Store Mer-
chants" against liability was held not responsible to A and B for
their share of the liability of A, B and C, a firm which carried on, in
a neighboring city, a business similar to that of A and B. "The part-
nerships in this case are not for all purposes to be regarded as legal
entities, but for the purpose of ascertaining the intention of the parties
20 d. at 11o.
2
'Peoplev. Nebbia, 262 N. Y. 259, 270, 186 N. E. 694, 699 (1933); infra, p. 28.
2229 N. Y. 201, 128 N. E. 16o (1920).
23Id. at 203, 128 N. E. at I6o. 24d. at 204, 128 N. E. at x6x.
'227 N. Y. 175, 124 N. B. 789 (1919).
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to the policy herein, we are governed by common parlance rather than
legal parlance." 26 In Matter of Durbrow,27 a testatrix directed her
executor to distribute the residuary estate "where he ... in his ...
judgment shall consider it will be most effective in the advancement
of Christ's Kingdom on earth." Many courts would have thought,
as the Appellate Division did, that this provision was "void for un-
certainty". Pound upheld it. He said, "While the bequest is in the
figurative form of a direction to the executor to dispose of the residue
of the estate 'in the advancement of Christ's Kingdom on earth', its
general purpose and meaning, read with the aid of our common
knowledge of the speech of the devout, are understood without dif-
ficulty." 28
In Goldstein v. The Pullman Company,29 Pound refused to say
that the company did or did not have "possession" of the passenger's
handbag during the night. ".. . It is unnecessary to make fine dis-
tinctions to determine the exaci status of the sleeping car company. It
is quasi bailee for hire and quasi watchman. In either capacity its duty
at night when the passengers are at rest is one of vigilance so that
the passenger may not lose his property through its inattention."
In upholding a statute designed to prevent irresponsible persons
from engaging in the business of buying milk from farmers,3 0 he criti-
cized the cases to the contrary as resting "on the abstract doctrine of
liberty of contract rather than the practical necessities of the case."
Judicial Legislation. Few judges have recognized so frankly the
existence, within limits, of free judicial choice. Thus in Stillwell Thea-
tre, Inc., v. Kaplan,3 ' he said, "The Court of Appeals has for many
years been disposed to leave the parties to peaceful labor disputes un-
molested when economic rather than legal questions were involved."
In Campbell v. New York Evening Post,32 Pound held that the privi-
lege of fair report extends to the publication of a pleading which has
been filed but has not yet received judicial notice. In that connection
he said, "We may as well disregard the overwhelming weight of
authority elsewhere and start with a rule of our own, consistent with
practical experience... Consistency requires us to go forward or to
go back. We cannot go back and exclude the publication of daily re-
ports of trials before a final decision is reached. The present distinc-
2id. at 179, 124 N. E. at 790.
27245 N. Y. 469, 157 N. E. 747 (1927).
281d. at 473, 157 N. E. at 748.
2220 N. Y. 549, 555, 116 N. E. 376 (1917).
30People v. Perretta, 253 N. Y. 305, 311, 171 N. E. 72, 74 (1930); infra, p. 28.
m'259 N. Y. 405, 409, 182 N. E. 63, 65 (1932).
32245 N. Y. 320, 157 N. E. 153 (1927).
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tion is indefensible. Therefore, we proceed to a logical conclusion and
uphold the claim of privilege on the ground that the filing of a plead-
ing is a public and official act in the course of judicial proceedings." 33
In his dissent in Allen v. Allen,3 4 in which every judge but two
ruled that a wife could not sue her husband for malicious prosecution,
Pound said: "We are now confronted with the rule of stare decisis
and enjoined to defer to cases already adjudicated. The law is said
to be established by the express decision of this court that the action
cannot be maintained. This argument, if applicable, is weighty but
not conclusive... When time makes ancient rules of personal rights
and remedies uncouth, illogical and productive of harm, they need
not be inexorably insisted upon." 5
In Seaver v. Ransom,36 Judge Pound and the majority of the court,
including Judge Cardozo, with three judges dissenting, upheld the
contract rights of a third party donee-beneficiary who was the niece of
the promisee, and whose case therefore did not fall within any of the
categories to which the doctrine of Lawrence v. Fox had come to be
confined. Pound was evidently minded to cut away all the arbitrary
New York limitations on the right of an intended beneficiary, and
bring his court into line with the body of American authority and
with good sense. After enumerating four kinds of cases in which
recovery had been allowed, he said: " . . . a general rule sustaining
recovery at the suit of the third party would include but few classes
of cases not included in these groups, either categorically or in prin-
ciple."'3 7 Lawrence v. Fox, he said, "attempted to adopt the general
doctrine."38 But, whether from caution or from the necessity of getting
half his colleagues to agree with him, he did not plainly lay down
"the general doctrine". Instead, he extended one of the established
special categories to cover the case before him, by pointing out that
"The desire of the childless aunt to make provision for a beloved and
favorite niece differs imperceptibly in law or in equity from the moral
duty of the parent to make testamentary provision for a child."3 9 It
is not surprising that, while the broad principle favored by Pound
has been applied in some of the subsequent New York cases, 40 in
31d. at 328, 157 N. E. at 156.
24246 N. Y. 571 , 159 N. E. 656 (1927); infra, p. 34.
361 d. at 575, 159 N. R. at 657. 3224 N. Y. 233, I2O N. E. 639 (1918).
37d. at 238, 239, 120 N. E. at 641.
381d. at 240, 12o N. B. at 641. 392d. at 239, 12o N. E. at 641.
40E. g., New York Pneumatic Service Co. v. Cox Contracting Co., 201 App.
Div. 33, 193 N. Y. Supp. 655 (Ist Dept. 1922); Strong v. American Pence Con-
struction Co., 245 N. Y. 48, 156 N. E. 92 (1927); Wilson v. Costich Co. Inc., 231
App. Div. 346, 247 N. Y. Supp. 131 (4th Dept. 1931); McClare v. Mass. Bond-
ing & Ins. Co., 266 N. Y. 371,195 N. E. 15 (1935).
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others it has not.41 In Croker v. New York Trust Co.4 2 Judge Pound
took the further liberal step of recognizing the right of the unbenefited
promisee to sue in equity to compel performance of the promise for
the beneficiary. On the other hand, in Gimenez v. Great Atlantic and
Pacific Tea Co.,43 he squarely declined, on grounds of stare decisis,
to make a further extension of Lawrence v. Fox. A husband, he held,
could not recover for loss of consortium and for expense due to the
injury of his wife by deleterious food which the defendant sold her.
He said: "We do not overlook the fact that a sort of third party bene-
ficiary rule might be invoked to give the husband a cause of action
in contract. The answer to that contention is that the courts have
never gone so far as to recognize warranties for the benefit of third
persons."44
In Harris v. Shoraill,4 Pound expressed his dissatisfaction with the
technical common-law rule that a contract under seal could not be
modified by parol agreement. He felt that the "time to dispose of the
rule effectively, if not now, is near at hand... When so much of the
old value and high nature of the seal has been lost, the court should
not be tenacious to preserve one of its minor incidents for the sake of
the rule but should rather strive to give effect to the real agreement
of the parties."4 6 Relying on these statements, the lower courts began
to hold that a contract under seal could be modified or discharged by
parol, and also that the related rule, that only parties named in a
sealed instrument could sue or be sued thereon, had been abrogated.4 7
Unfortunately for these liberal views, the statements made in Harris
v. Shorall were dicta, and this fact was later seized upon by the Court
of Appeals in two decisions reaffirming the common-law rules. In
one of these,48 the court observed that nothing said in Harris v. Shorall
even suggested that a party not named in a sealed instrument could
be sued thereon; in the other,49 the court overruled what was said in
Harris v. Shorall and held that a sealed contract could not be modi-
41Fosmire v. National Surety Co., 229 N. Y. 44, 127 N. E. 472 (192o); Freed
v. Tishman, 1i9 Misc. 721, 197 N.Y. Supp. 259 (Sup. Ct. 1922); Jacoby v. Speyer,
127 Misc. 33, 215 N. Y. Supp. 145 (Sup. Ct. 1926).
4'245 N. Y. 17, x56 N. E. 81 (1927).
4'264 N. Y. 39o, 191 N. E. 27 (1934).
44d. at 395, I9I N. E. at 29.
4523o N. Y. 343, 13O N. E. 572 (1921).
4d. at 348, 13o N. E. at 573.
47Lagumis v. Gerard, x16 Misc. 471, 19o N. Y. Supp. 207 (Sup. Ct. 1921);
Van Ingen v. Belmont, 121 Misc. 109, 2oo N. Y. Supp. 847 (Sup. Ct. 1923); Di-
amond v. Talbot, 123 Misc. 339, 2o5 N. Y. Supp. 3o9 (Sup. Ct. 1924).
48Crowley v. Lewis, 239 N. Y. 264, 146 N. E. 374 (1925).
49Cammack v. Slattery & Bro., Inc., 241 N. Y. 39, 148 N. E. 781 (1925).
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fled by parol. Pound concurred in the first of these two decisions but
was absent when the second was decided. The change originally sug-
gested by him was finally adopted by the Legislature in 1935 in an
amendment to the Civil Practice Act.50
Pound knew that the common-law rules absolving a municipal
corporation of liability for its torts are often anti-social because in-
humane. His tendency was to interpret them narrowly. In Herman
v. Board of Education,51 a school board had installed an unguarded
buzz-saw for the use of the students in manual training, and a student
using this saw was injured. Affirming judgment for the plaintiff,
Pound said: "The state has not created an irresponsible instrumental-
ity of government and invested it with the power to put children at
work at dangerous machinery which it would be a statutory offense
against its laws to use in private industries."5 2 In Augustine v. Town
of Brant,53 the town was maintaining a public park and bathing beach
without giving adequate warning of its dangerous character and with-
out taking adequate measures to protect bathers. When a bather
was drowned, the town's contention that it was performing a "gov-
ernmental function" was overruled and it was held liable, on the basis
of a "wise public policy," 54 and "the modern tendency . . . against
the rule of non-liability." 55 These were unanimous decisions. In Cana-
van v. City of Mechanicville,50 the court divided. The plaintiff sued
the municipality for supplying water which contained typhoid germs.
Admitting that. the city was performing a private rather than a gov-
ernmental function, and that furnishing water was a sale of goods
within the provisions of the Sales Act, a majority of the court never-
theless held the city not liable on the theory that, since the plaintiff
did not make known the purpose for which he intended to use the
water, no warranty of fitness for human consumption could be im-
plied, and also on the ground that adequate inspection was impos-
sible. Pound's dissent was forceful: "If we adopt, as seems inevitable,
the theory that the water supplied by a municipal corporation -for
domestic purposes is sold as such by it to the consumers, I fail to
comprehend how we can escape the application of the doctrine of
implied warranty of wholesomeness." 57
'ON. Y. Laws 1935, c. 708: "....A written instrument, hereafter executed,
which modifies, varies or cancels a sealed instrument, executed prior to the effec-
tive date of this section, shall not be deemed invalid or ineffectual because of the
absence of a seal thereon."
51234 N. Y. 196, 137 N. E. 24 (1922). 62Id. at 201, 137 N. E. at 25.
3249 N. Y. 198, 163 N. E. 732 (1928). 4MId. at 206, 163 N. E. at 734.
5Id. at 205, 163 N. E. at 734.
5229 N. Y. 473, 128 N. E. 882 (1920). 67Id. at 481, 128 N. E. at 884.
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A curious lapse into mechanical jurisprudence occurred in 1921.
In Drobner v. Peters,58 the court, in an opinion by Pound, refused to
allow suit by a child for pre-natal injuries negligently caused. Judge
Cardozo dissented. The decision of the lower court in the child's
favor had been welcomed as "an interesting and commendable de-
velopment of the law."59 Both in its result and in its argument,
Pound's opinion is anomalous in so liberal a judge. Intimating that
"sympathy and natural justice point the way" to a decision in the
child's favor, he permitted the way to be blocked by the existence of
hostile precedents in other states, the lack of favorable precedent, and
the idea that the child in the mother's womb "had no seperate exis-
tence of .its own . . . His .full rights as a human being sprang into
existence with his birth." Pound appeared to forget that a court may
make law where there was none before, which is all that was neces-
sary to a decision in the child's favor, and may even reverse pre-
existing law. He was unconscious that in conferring an immunity
on the defendant he was in fact making law no less than if he had
conferred a right upon the plaintiff. No doubt the extreme rarity of
"pre-natal injury" as a matter of fact, and the danger of mistake and
fraud, furnish tenable grounds for denying a right of action, but the
former consideration seems not to have been present in Pound's mind,
and the "practical inconvenience and possible injustice" to which he
referred in passing seem to have had little influence on his decision.
In 1934 Judge Pound suggested to the Law Revision Commission that
it consider whether the rule of Drobuer v. Peters should be revised
by legislation. 0°
No similar submission to nineteenth-century legalism seems to have
occurred in the thirteen years that remained to Judge Pound after
Drobner v. Peters. But in 1932 he declined an opportunity to liberal-
ize the law on the ground that it was possible to decide the case
before him without passing on the interesting point. The plantiff
proposed to erect a large billboard near a road; the Superintendent
of Public Works proposed to screen it from view. Pound observed
that the question how far aesthetic sensibilities might be protected at
the expense of property owners was an open one, and he did nothing
to settle the question. He said: "The question is whether the Superin-
tendent was justified in erecting this screen to shut off the view of
this sign in this location ... Enough for this decision to say that the
Superintendent of Public Works may act reasonably in his discretion
58232 N. Y. 220, 133 N. E. 567 (1921).
59(I92I) 21 COL. L. REv. 199.
60The Commission transmitted its study of the subject to the Legislature with-
out recommendation. REPORT OF THE LAW REvISION COMMISSION (1935) p. 451.
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for the benefit of public travel in screening a billboard at a dangerous
curve when by its enormity such a structure may divert the attention
of the motorist from the road." 1 ". . . Beauty may not be queen but
she is not an outcast beyond the pale of protection or respect. She may
at least shelter herself under the wing of safety, morality or de-
cency." 62 Here Pound's result, on the facts before him, was the liberal
one, but by adopting a conventional technic he avoided giving expres-
sion to liberal doctrine.
Pound's opinions show a relative indifference to the customs and
interests of persons engaged in business activity. Though he was not,
in general, reluctant to innovate, cases involving business practices
often found him insisting upon what he considered established law.
In McQuade v. Stoneham, 3 the court was asked to enforce an agree-
ment made by a small group of shareholders in a closed corporation
that each would use his best efforts to keep the others as directors and
as officers. The defendant, a party to the agreement, obtained control
of the corporation and subsequently succeeded in getting plaintiff
dropped. Pound refused to enforce the contract in specie by reinstat-
ing the plaintiff. He took it as established that, although stockholders
might unite to elect directors, they could not unite to place limitations
on the power of the directors to select officers and agents. "It is urged,"
he said, "that we should pay heed to the morals and manners of the
market place to sustain this agreement ... rather than base our de-
cision on any outworn notions of public policy."' ' Conceding that such
agreements were not uncommon, that public policy was a "dangerous
guide", that the defendant had treated the plaintiff shabbily, he felt
"constrained by authority" to hold the contract illegal and void.65
There was an additional ground for the decision, and two of Pound's
colleagues concurred only on this other ground and repudiated
Pound's conservative treatment of the point of corporation law.66
Similarly in Langel v. Betz,67 Pound refused to follow the Ameri-
can Law Institute and treat the acceptance of-the assignment of rights
under a contract as importing, in the absence of contrary evidence,
a promise to perform the assignor's duties. He conceded that the In-
stitute's rule was "perhaps, more in harmony with modern ideas of
contractual relations." In Gotham Music Service v. D. & H. Music
Publishing Co.,68 the plaintiff had revived a little-known song called
61Perlmutter v. Greene, 259 N. Y. 327, 332, 333, 334 (1932).
62ld. at 332.
63263 N. Y. 323, 189 N. E. 234 (1934). 64td. at 329, 189 N. E. at 236.
6Id. at 330, 189 N. E. at 237. 6Id. at 333, 189 N. E. at 238.
6725o N. Y. 159, 163, 164 N. E. 890, 892 (1928).
68259 N. Y. 86, 181 N. E. 57 (1932).
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"Gambler's Blues," had advertised it widely under the name "St.
James' Infirmary," and had succeeded in making it popular. The de-
fendant then proceeded to sell the same song under the name "St.
James' Infirmary or Gambler's Blues," and the Court of Appeals
refused to restrain him from doing so. In a dissenting opinion, Judge
Crane thought it unfair that the defendant should reap the harvest of
the plaintiff's advertising. 69 Pound, writing for the majority, was un-
moved by this aspect of the case. The right to enjoin acts as unfair
competition, he said, depends upon a showing that the public is mis-
led into thinking that it is buying the plaintiff's products.
In Weissman v. Banque De Bruxelles,"° A, an officer of a corpora-
tion, indorsed a check payable to the corporation and deposited it in
his personal account in a bank in Belgium. The bank forwarded the
check to Washington for collection and credited the proceeds to A's
account. A withdrew the funds and dissipated them. Under Belgian
law, the bank was under no duty of inquiry, and hence not liable to
the corporation; under New York law it would be liable. Instead of
holding that the Belgian law governed, Pound decided that the trans-
fer took place in Washington, presumed that the law there was the
same as that of New York, and held the bank. This result Pound
thought fair because banks are constantly taking chances, and this
bank, he thought, took a chance.71 The case has been widely criti-
cized, 72 both on theoretical grounds and as restricting the transfer
of negotiable instruments and placing a heavy burden on banks by
holding them liable under a law foreign to them and their transactions.
Again, in Casey v. Kastel,73 Pound allowed an infant who had rati-
fied a sale of stock through an agent to disaffirm and to recover from
her agent and from the agent's brokers. It has been suggested that
such decisions are extreme and that an infant should be estopped to
disaffirm when he has taken the benefit of a contract,74 but Pound
was apparently of the opinion that the convenience of modem busi-
ness should not be allowed to restrict the protection which the law
has given to infants.
In Forstntann v. foray Holding Co.,75 Pound innovated in favor
of business, but the facts presented no substantial interest opposed to
G9Id. at 9o, 18i N. E. at 58.
70254 N. Y. 488, 173 N. E. 835 (1930).
7id. at 496, 173 N. E. at 837.
72Notes (1931) 44 HARV. L. REv. 855; (1931) 31 COL. L. REV. 704; (1931) 29
MIcH. L. REV. 928; (193) 17 VA. L. REv. 493.
73237 N. Y. 305, 142 N. E. 671 (1924).
"Note (1923) 8 CORNELL L. Q. 162.
7244 N. Y. 22, 154 N. E. 652 (1926).
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that of business. Lands of the plaintiff and of the defendant, in the
same block on Madison Avenue, were subject to covenants restricting
buildings to residence purposes. The restriction dated from 1907, and
was to expire in 1929. In 1916, the district was zoned for business.
After the residence character of the neighborhood was largely gone,
the defendant in 1924 erected a two-story office building. The action
of the Appellate Division in ordering its removal was in line with
earlier decisions and dicta.75a The Court of Appeals reversed, because,
as Pound said, the relief given below would "bear heavily on the de-
fendants without benefiting the plaintiffs"; it would neither add to
the value of the plaintiff's property nor make it more desirable for
residence purposes.
Constitutionality of Statutes. Judge Pound seldom thought that a
legislature had exceeded its constitutional authority. Repeatedly he
dissented, sometimes alone, when the majority of the court held legis-
lative action invalid.75b
While the fate of the Workmen's Compensation Act in the Court
of Appeals is a familiar story, it is not so well known that the first
judicial opinion in America sustaining this type of legislation was
written by Judge Pound. The first compensation act to be adopted
by any American state was passed in New York in 1910.76 In a con-
cise opinion written in the same year,77 Judge Pound, then a justice
of the Supreme Court, upheld the statute, pointing out the unwisdom
of construing the Constitution so strictly as to deprive a State of the
power to enact into law "the wishes of the citizens as they may deem
best for the public welfare."' 78 Observing that "our jurisprudence
offers examples of legal liability without fault, ' 79 Pound felt that the
authorities cited by counsel for the railroad "merely point out the
shifting character of the border line between statutes which are upheld
by the court as being a legitimate exercise of the legislative power to
pass all manner of necessary and wholesome acts for the protection
and well-being of the public, although such acts may interfere with
personal liberty.., and statutes which are held by the courts to inter-
fere without warrant with the privilege of pursuing an ordinary trade
or calling."80
76See (1927) 12 CORNELL L. Q. 518.
15bBut see People ex rel. Doyle v. Atwell, infra p. 32. And cf. McMaster v.
Gould, 24o N. Y. 379, 148 N. E. 556 (1925). 76N. Y. Laws i9I0; c. 674.
"Ives v. South Buffalo Railway Co., 68 Misc. 643, 124 N. Y. Supp. 920 (Sup.
Ct. 1910).
78 d. at 645, 124 N. Y. Supp. at 922, quoting Brown, J. in Holden v. Hardy,
169 U. S. 366, 387, x8 Sup. Ct. 383, 386 (1898).
9Id. at 645, 124 N. Y. Supp. at 923.
80Id. at 646, 647, 124 N. Y. Supp. at 923, 924.
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Affirmed without opinion in the Appellate Division,81 this decision
could not pass the barriers of due process set up by the Court of
Appeals,8 2 and it was not until the State Constitution was amended
in 191383 that this type of legislation became effective in New York.8 4
Meanwhile other states bad adopted Workmen's Compensation Acts
which were almost unaninously upheld by the courts. With judicial
caution, many of these courts "distinguished" the Ives case on the
ground that the New York statute had imposed a compulsory and
exclusive remedy, and held that legislation offering the parties an
election to pursue their common-law remedy was valid.8 5 But the
"distinction seems to be one without a difference, 80 as the basic
principle of liability without fault, called "revolutionary" by the Court
of Appeals,8 7 was present in nearly all of these statutes. Other courts
upheld compulsory legislation and expressly repudiated the view taken
by the Court of Appeals.8 8 Pound's pioneer opinion was seldom or
never cited.
The New York court itself, perhaps influenced by the almost unani-
mous concurrence of other courts in Pound's position, quietly changed
its views. Although the Ives case had been decided partly on the
8114o App. Div. 921 (4th Dept. 191o) Williams, J. dissenting.
82201 N. Y. 271, 94 N. E .431 (1911).
83N. Y. CONST. art. I, § 19.
84N. Y. Laws 1913, c. 816 and N. Y. Laws 1914, c. 41; upheld in Matter of
Jensen v. Southern Pacific Co., 215 N. Y. 514, 1O9 N. E. 6oo (1915), and in New
York Central Railroad v. White, 243 U. S. 188, 37 Sup. Ct. 247 (1917).
8In Re Opinion of the Justices, 209 Mass. 607, 96 N. E. 308 (1911); State v.
Creamer, 85 Ohio St. 349, 97 N. E. 602 (1912); Sexton v. Newark District Tele-
graph Co., 84 N. J. L. 85, 86 Atl. 451 (1913); Deibeikis v. Link-Belt Co., 261
IUl. 454, 1O4 N. E. 211 (1914); Shade v. Ash Grove Lime and Portland Cement
Co., 93 Kan. 257, 144 Pac. 249 (1914), afg 92 Kan. 146, 139 Pac. 1193 (1914);
Mathison v. Minneapolis St. Ry. Co., 126 Minn. 286, 148 N, W. 71 (1914); Borg-
nis v. Falk, 147 Wis. 327, 133 N. W. 209 (1911); Mackin v. Detroit-Timkin Axle
Co., 187 Mich. 8, 153 N. W. 49 (1915); Middleton v. Texas Power & Light Co.,
1o8 Tex. 96, 185 S. W. 556 (1916); Sayles v. Foley, 38 R. I. 484, 96 Atl. 34o (1916).
86Wambaugh, Workmen's Compensation Acts: Their Theory and Their Consti-
tutionality (I9II) 25 HARv. L. REv. 129, 137.
87Ives v. South Buffalo Ry. Co., 2O N. Y. 271, 285, 94 N. E. 431, 436 (1911).
8 State v. Clausen, 65 Wash. 156, 117 Pac. 1101 (1911); Western Indemnity
Co. v. Pillsbury, 170 Cal. 686, 151 Pac. 398 (1915). Cf. Cunningham v. North-
western Improvement Co., 44 Mont. 18O, ii9 Pac. 554 (1911).
Contra: The first Kentucky statute was held unconstitutional, partly because
it provided for a compulsory remedy. State Journal Co. v. Workmen's Compen-
sation Board, 161 Ky. 562, 170 S. W. 437 (1914). A new statute, making the
remedy elective, was upheld. Greene v. Caldwell, 170 Ky. 571, 186 S. W. 648
(x916). Cf. Hunter v. Colfax Consolidated Coal Co., 175 Ia. 245, 154 N. W. 1037
(1916).
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ground that the statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Federal Constitution, 9 the court held in I915 that all difficulties had
been removed by an amendment to the State Constitution.9" The lack
of logic has been pointed out,91 but the covert method of overruling
an unfortunate decision, while not admirable, is better than none. The
final vindication of Pound's position came in 1918, when the United
States Supreme Court in the Arizona Employers' Liability Cases92
held that the imposition of liability without fault in hazardous employ-
ments did not contravene the Fourteenth Amendment. As Pound him-
self was able to point out in .1933, "much that was said in the work-
me/n's compensation case... about the constitutional vice of provid-
ing a remedy which takes one's property without fault on his part was
rendered obsolete by Arizona Employers' Liability Cases."93
In People ex rel. Alpha Portland Cement Co v. Knapp,94 Pound
upheld a tax or license statute which every other member of the court
considered unconstitutional wholly or in part. The statute imposed
a license fee or tax upon foreign corporations for the privilege of
doing business in the state. Net income to be used as a basis for the
tax was to bear the same ratio to entire net income which certain
kinds of assets within the state bore to total assets of certain kinds.
Certain intangibles were to be excluded from the list of assets, but
income from them was to be included in the income used as a basis
for the tax. The prevailing opinion, by Judge Cardozo, took the posi-
tion that the statute prescribed "a rule of allocation which, as applied
to foreign corporations holding bonds and shares in other states, in-
volves an artificial and arbitrary augmentation of the value of the local
privilege"; that the corportion should be permitted to subtract from
income the amount derived from bond interest, and to add to its assets
outside the state its shares in other corporations. Pound saw no reason
for holding "that a foreign corporation, if admitted to another state,
may be assessed for the privilege of doing business in such state only
on the earnings of the local business or on the capital employed there-
in. The license fee exacted by this state is in no sense a tax on the
entire business or property, or the entire income of the relator." 95
On the other hand, in People ex rel. Hanorer National Bank v. Gold-
892oi N. Y. 271, 294, 94 N. E. 431, 439 (1911).
"0Matter of Jensen v. Southern Pacific Co., 215 N.Y. 514, io9 N.E. 6oo (1915).
9Dissenting opinion of Henshaw, J. in Western Indemnity Co. v. Pillsbury,
170 Cal. 686, 712, 151 Pac. 398, 409 (1915).
2250 U. S. 400, 39 Sup. Ct. 553 (1918).
9"Matter of Evans v. Berry, 262 N. Y. 61, 69, 186 N. E. 203, 205 (1933).
"'230 N. Y. 48, 129 N. E. 202 (1920).
25Id. at 69, 129 N. E. at 210.
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fogle,9 8 he wrote the opinion by which the court held unconstitutional
a state tax on the capital stock of national banks. The state, he held,
"discriminates against national bank shares by imposing a tax both on
the shares and the dividends, while it imposes a tax on the income
only of other competing capital in the hands of private bankers and
other individuals."' 7 His record makes it clear that he was expressing
a real regret, and not a pious platitude, when he said, "The discrimi-
nation is unfortunately too clear to escape recognition. 9 8 .
In Matter of Doyle,99 another case in which Judge Cardozo wrote
the prevailing opinion and Pound alone dissented, they differed on
the question whether the legislature could by joint resolution, un-
signed by the governor, grant immunity to witnesses in aid of a legis-
lative investigation. Pound, with his usual tendency to sustain the
action of legislatures, held that the joint resolution gave valid protec-
tion, and that a contumacious witness could be punished for contempt,
while Cardozo held that the witness could be required to testify only
in regard to matters concerning which a statute gave him immunity.
No judge questioned the legality of the investigation as a whole, or
the power of the legislature to punish for contempt in connection with
it, although a mere joint resolution and not a statute gave the com-
mittee its authority; and Pound reasoned that the power to grant
immunity to witnesses was as fairly incidental to the investigation
itself as the power to punish for contempt.
In Mills v. Sweeney,' a liberal attitude on Pound's part toward
one piece of municipal legislation was vitiated by a curiously narrow
attitude toward another. The city council of Buffalo had enacted an
ordinance providing that election officials should submit at a general
election any question of public policy petitioned for, in order to obtain
the opinion of the electors thereon. Under this ordinance the question
was submitted to the voters: "Shall the city of Buffalo own and oper-
ate an electric plant ... in order to produce revenue and thus lower
the city taxes ?" The Court of Appeals held that the underlying ordi-
nance provided for a "referendum", and was not authorized by the
city charter. Pound alone thought the ordinance valid. He pointed
out that it involved no true referendum, since it merely permitted the
electors to give advice, not to make decisions. He concurred, how-
ever, in the court's result, because of the form of the particular ques-
tion that was submitted to the voters. By assuming that city taxes
"234 N. Y. 345, 137 N. E. 611 (1922).
97 d. at 352, 137 N. E. at 613. 9RId. at 353, 137 N. B. at 613.
g92 57 N. Y. 244, 177 N. E. 489 (193r).
1219 N. Y. 2r3, 222, 114 N. E. 65, 68 (1916).
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would be lowered, he said, "it begs the very question which it pur-
ports to submit." While it is arguable that Pound's sense of logic was
not improperly offended, he cites no authority for his conclusion that
logical ineptitude is a fatal vice in an advisory referendum. Argu-
mentative matter does not vitiate a statute, and it is not apparent why
it should vitiate a referendum. Pound seems to have devised a wholly
novel rule.
In People v. Westchester County National Bank,2 the majority of
the court held invalid a bond issue in aid of a soldiers' bonus, largely
on the basis of a provision of the New York Constitution that "The
credit of the State shall not in any manner be given or loaned to or
in aid of any individual, association or corporation." Pound and Car-
dozo dissented, each in an opinion. They thought it clear that war
concerned the state as well as the nation, and that a bonus to ex-
soldiers was not in the nature of a prohibited gratuity. The purpose
"to supplement the pay of the soldiers and thereby to promote military
zeal in the future", said Pound, was a public purpose.
In the recent case of Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co.,3
the Court of Appeals met the question of the validity of the Joint
Resolution of Congress which authorized and required debtors to
discharge in legal tender, and not otherwise, obligations which had
been contracted expressly in terms of gold. Judge Pound and three
of his associates, relying chiefly on the power to coin money and regu-
late the value thereof, sustained the action of Congress. "Considera-
tions of convenience are not without weight. All arrangements for
payment in money in the future are necessarily under the paramount
authority of the political sovereign delegated powers of Congress."
The decision was affirmed by the United States Supreme Court.4
In Matter of Evans v. Berry,5 a police officer in New York City,
while pursuing robbers, had accidentally shot and wounded the plain-
tiff. The Assembly then passed a local law allowing the city Board of
Estimate to award compensation to persons injured in this manner,
and the Board made an award to the plaintiff. The Appellate Division
denied the validity of this award, but Pound, writing for the court,
sustained the award. He recognized a moral obligation upon the city
which it could be allowed to assume without violating that provision
of the State Constitution which forbids a city to give its money in aid
of an individual. 6
2231 N. Y. 465, 492, 493, 132 N. E. 241, 251 (1921).
3265 N. Y. 37, 41, 191 N. B. 726, 728 (1934).
4294 U. S. 240, 55 Sup. Ct. 407 (i935).
5262 N. Y. 6i, x86 N. E. 203 (1933).
BArt. VIII, § io.
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Pound's liberal attitude towards constitutional questions is ex-
pressed in several cases involving emergency legislation, in each of
which he was able to speak for a unanimous or almost unanimous
court. In i92o the State Legislature passed an emergency housing
law, stating that a shortage of housing existed, that an unprecedented
number of dispossess proceedings were pending, and that landlords
were taking advantage of the situation to exact exorbitant rents. The
law deprived landlords for two years of possessory remedies to re-
move tenants already in possession who were willing and able to pay
a reasonable rent; and a rent in excess of that charged during the
preceding year was presumed unreasonable. The constitutionality of
this legislation was attacked, without success, in People ex rel. Dur-
ham Realty Corp. v. La Fetra.7 The court, Pound said, will not ques-
tion the finding of the legislature that an emergency exists, nor will
it oppose theories of laissez-faire economics to the legislative finding
that the state of supply and demand is abnormal and that profiteering
and oppression have become general. "It is with this condition and
not with economic theory that the state has to deal in the existing
emergency." While an emergency may not become the source of
power, nor furnish an excuse for suspending the Constitution, it "may
afford a reason for putting forth a latent governmental power already
enjoyed but not previously exercised."9 Such a power is the police
power, "a dynamic agency, vague and undefined in its scope, which
takes private property or limits its use when great public needs re-
quire, uncontrolled by the constitutional requirement of due process.
Either the rights of property and contract must when necessary yield
to the public convenience, advantage and welfare, or it must be found
that the state has surrendered one of the attributes of sovereignty for
which governments are founded and made itself powerless to secure
to its citizens the blessings of freedom and to promote the general
welfare."'1 When conditions change, the law must adjust itself. "Nov-
elty is no argument against constitutionality."" Although the regula-
tion of prices, outside certain fields, is unusual, "the power of regula-
tion exists ... and is not limited to public uses or to property where
the right to demand and receive service exists or to monopolies or to
emergencies. It may embrace all cases of public interest, and the ques-
tion is whether the subject has become important enough for the pub-
723o N. Y. 429, 13o N. E. 6Ol (1921). The same law was upheld by the U. S.
Sup. Ct. in a five to four decision. Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, 256
U. S. 170, 41 Sup. Ct. 465 (1921). People ex rel. Durham R. Co. v. La Fetra was
cited with approval.
sld. at 444, 13o N. E. at 6o6. "Id. at 445, 13o N. E. at 6o6.
201d. at 443, 13o N. E. at 6o5. hId. at 446, 13o N. E. at 607.
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lic to justify public'action."'1 This was broad doctrine in 1921. "The
struggle to meet changing conditions through new legislation con-
stantly goes on. The fundamental question is whether society is pre-
pared for the change. The law of each age is ultimately what that age
thinks should be the law.'
3
In People v. Beakes Dairy Co. 1 4 and People v. Perretta,15"Pound
upheld statutes which provided that no one could carry on the busi-
ness of buying milk from producers for resale without obtaining a
license, and that no one could obtain a license without posting a bond
or satisfying the state commissioner of his ability to meet the claims
of the producers from whom he bought. Irresponsible distributors,
as the legislature knew, had so frequently failed to pay producers for
their milk that there was danger of a refusal on the part of farmers
to produce milk for shipment. The statute therefore was not solely
for the farmer's benefit; "If it gives him 'a club to aid in the collection
of debts which is not given to other creditors' . . . it gives it to him
to keep open the stream of milk flowing from farm to city as well as
to guard him from financial loss."'- "The validity of police regulations
must depend on the circumstances of each case and the character of
the regulation, whether arbitrary or reasonable. A legitimate public
purpose may always be served without regard to the constitutional
limitations of due process and equal protection."' 1
In People v. Nebbia,18 Pound stressed the emergency conditions
which produced the statute fixing minimum prices for milk, and ac-
corded the utmost respect to the legislative determination of condi-
tions. He cited the finding of the Pitcher Committee that "the eco-
nomic law of supply and demand cannot be relied upon either to insure
the consumers of a continuous and adequate supply of pure and whole-
some milk, or to prevent grave injury to this important industry and
its possible disintegration." He then held that in the light of these
findings the regulations imposed by the statute were reasonable. "We
are accustomed to rate regulation in cases of public utilities and other
analogous cases and to the extension of such regulative power into
similar fields."'19 Holdings apparently contra "are to be read in the
light of surrounding circumstances . . . Sentences in judicial opinions
are misleading if taken out of their context and read as if they were
the gist of the decision".20 "Doubtless the statute before us would be
"2d. at 445, 13o N. E. at 607.
13d. at 450, 13o N. E. at 6o8.
14222 N. Y. 416, 119 N. E. 115 (1918).
15253 N. Y. 305, 171 N. E. 72 (1930). 'Old. at 311, 71 N. E. at 74.
17d. at 309, 171 N. B. at 73. 1262 N. Y. 259, 186 N. E. 694 (1933).
19d. at 268, 186 N. E. at 698. 0Id. at 270, 186 N. E. at 698, 699.
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condemned by an earlier generation as a temerarious interference
with the rights of property and contract; ... with the natural law
of supply and demand. But we must not fail to consider that the police
power is the least limitable of the powers of government and that it
extends to all the great public needs; that constitutional law is a pro-
gressive science; that statutes aiming to establish a standard of social
justice, to conform the law to the accepted standards of the commu-
nity, to stimulate the production of a vital food product by fixing liv-
ing standards of prices for the producer, are to be interpreted with
that degree of liberality which is essential to the attainment of the
end in view."2
1
While Pound, bound by the decisions of the United States Supreme
Court, emphasized the emergency aspect of the legislation, the major-
ity of the Supreme Court, in affirming his decision,22 took the bold
step of sweeping aside the limitations which that court had previously
imposed on the power of the states to regulate prices, by which the
power had been confined to businesses "affected with a public inter-
est," and concluded that "a state is free to adopt whatever economic
policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare, and to
enforce that policy by legislation adapted to its purpose."J2 3
Interpretation of Statutes. Many of the decisions, discussed under
the present head, in which Pound showed his tendency to give sub-
stantial meaning to statutes, might equally well be presented under
the head of decisions favorable to the interests of workingmen or other
relatively unprivileged groups. 24 Conversely, most of the decisions
involving the interests of married women, which are presented 24a
with the unprivileged-group cases, involve also a broad interpretation
of statutes.
Sympathizing from the outset with the philosophy of workmen's
compensation, Pound took the position that the law "should be con-
strued fairly, indeed liberally, in favor of the employee."2 He al-
lowed compensation in one case where the accident arose out of
another employee's horseplay on the job.2 6 But ready as he was to
extend the statute as far as its language permitted, he was careful
to extend it no further. If an employee steps into i refrigerating plant
and contracts a cold which lowers his powers of resistance so that
2IId. at 270, 186 N. E. at 699.
"Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 54 Sup. Ct. 505 (1934).
2Id. at 536, 537, 54 Sup. Ct. at 516.
'See p. 37, infra.
aSee p. 34, infra.
2'Matter of Heitz v. Ruppert, 218 N. Y. 148, 154, 112 N. E. 750, 752 (I916).
'Ibid.
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more serious diseases develop, he has no right to compensation be-
cause there has been no "accident" within the meaning of the act, no
catastrophic or extraordinary event.2 7 In Matter of Sweeting v.
American Knife Co.,28 claimant's face was disfigured by the explosion
of an emery wheel. The court held such injuries compensable, partly
on the ground that insurance against pain of mind and body is as
legitimate as insurance against loss of earnings. Pound, concurring
specially, did not think that the Act went so far. While the Consti-
tution would permit compensation for all industrial accidents, the
Act does not so provide, but is based on the theory that the com-
munity should carry the burden of impaired earning capacity. But
Pound agreed with Cardozo that in this case the injuries caused im-
paired ability to get work, and so were compensable. In another case
Poundheld that the theory of the Act, to make good impaired earning
capacity, bars consecutive and concurrent awards for separate injuries
incurred in the same accident.2 9 Again, a corporate officer who re-
ceives a salary of $70 a week and collects $3o,ooo a year in dividends
is not an "employee" within the meaning of the Act, even though he
is injured while performing manual labor.30 In Shanahan v. Monarch
Engineering Co.,31 full effect was given to that section of the Act
which abrogates common-law remedies.
The Act provides that the Compensation Commission "shall not
be bound by common law or statutory rules of evidence." 32 In Matter
of Carroll v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 3 3 the majority of the court held
that hearsay is not sufficient to support a finding; that there must
be a modicum of "legal evidence".3 4 Seabury and Pound dissented,
the latter pointing out that rules of evidence evolved under the jury
system might well be "modified and liberalized in their application,
when the hearing is before tribunals which adjudicate both on law and
fact." 35 If the evidence is admissible, its probative force is for the
commission. "It is not to be anticipated that the commission will
become confused, waste time, lose sight of the main issue and base
awards or refuse them on haphazard hearsay, as our convention is that
a jury might if it were permitted to hear everything relevant."36
27Matter of Lerner v. Rump Bros., 241 N. 7. 153, 149 N. E. 334 (1925).
28226 N. Y. 199, 123 N. E. 82 (1919).
"9Matter of Marhoffer v. Marhoffer, 220 N. Y. 543, 116 N. E. 379 (1917).
30Matter of Bowne v. Bowne Co., 221 N. Y. 28, 116 N. E. 364 (1917).
312x9 N. Y. 469, 114 N. E. 795 (19x6).
nWORKMEN'S COMPENSATIoN ACT, § 68 (Now § 118).
33218 N. Y. 435, 113 N. E. 507 (1916).
34Id. at 44o, 113 N. E. at 5o9.
35Id. at 447, 113 N. E. at 511.
36Id. at 450, 113 N. E. at 512.
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In Encarnacion- v. Jamison,37 the plaintiff, a stevedore, brought an
action against his employer for an assault committed by a foreman
who was endeavoring to hurry the work of loading a barge. The Ap-
pellate Division invoked the fellow-servant rule and denied recov-
ery. 38 In an opinion by Pound, the Court of Appeals reversed. In
1920 Congress had passed the Jones Act, giving to "seamen" the same
rights and remedies granted railway employees in the Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act of 19o8. The 19o8 Act, in abrogating the fellow-
servant rule, referred specifically only to actions for negligence and
did not mention wilful misconduct. Pound not only followed a decision
of Holmes that "seamen" might include stevedores, 39 but proceeded
to hold that negligence might include wilful misconduct. It seems a
clear instance of taking a statute to mean what the legislature would
have said if it had thought of it, rather than what it actually said. This
decision has been criticized as misinterpreting the doctrines of mari-
time law.40 But the United States Supreme Court accepted Pound's
broad interpretation and affirmed his decision.41
People ex rel. Wedgewood Realty Col., Inc. v. Lynch,42 involved
the question whether a tax on "dividends" was applicable to a trans-
action whereby the stockholders of a corporation, which had a large
surplus, transferred their stock to a new corporation in exchange for
stock and bonds of the new corporation. Pound and four other judges
held that the bond issue, to the extent of the old surplus, was "a divi-
dend in fact although not in form." It represented a distribution of
earnings, although the new corporation which issued the bonds had
earned nothing; it was a scheme to evade the tax on dividends, and
"The courts should not be deluded by bookkeeping devices." Literal-
ly, Judge Lehman was right when he said, in dissenting, that "no
dividends were declared." Pound and the majority refused to be
bound, in a tax case, by a concept of "dividend" derived from banking
or corporation law. They expanded the statute to include a related
subject matter which the legislature might reasonably have included.
In City of Rochester v. Rochester Gas &" Electric Corp.,43 Pound
37253 N. Y. 218, 167 N. E. 422 (1929).
2224 App. Div. 260, 23o N. Y. Supp. 16 (2nd Dept. 1928).
"
9International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U. S. 50, 47 Sup. Ct. 19 (1926).
4'Note (1929) 4 TULANE L. Rzv. 12o. The note points out that a seaman origi-
nally had a cause of action only for injuries arising out of the unseaworthiness
of the vessel, and it was for this reason alone, and not because of the fellow-ser-
vant rule, that he was denied recovery for an assault by an officer. See also note
(1930) 5 TULANE L. REV. 120.
4tJamison v. Encarnacion, 281 U. S. 635, 50 Sup. Ct. 440 (1930).
42262 N. Y. 202, 205, 208, 186 N. E. 673, 674 (1933).
43233 N. Y. 39, 134 N. E. 828 (1922).
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was the only member of the court who considered that a statutory
prohibition against the collection of rent for meters was applicable to
a gas company's "service charge" of forty cents per month. Other
examples of broad statutory interpretation are Ricluzrdson Press v.
Albright,44 which involved the requirement of the Statute of Frauds
that a promise to pay another's debt be in writing; People v. Feder-
ated Radio Corp.,45 which involved the meaning of "fraud" in the
Blue Sky Law; and Kelso & Co. v. Ellis,46 in which the court at last
recognized the force of the provision of the Negotiable Instruments
Law which makes an antecedent debt "value", and consequently over-
ruled the old case of Coddington v. Bay.47 Pound said: "The New
York rule was so well established that the inertia of Coddington vz.
Bay carried it along for some distance before the external force of the
Negotiable Instruments Law acted upon it... Even in this court a
dictum in Bank of America v. Waydell s reveals the habit of bench
and bar to look to cases rather than statutes for principles of com-
mercial law until attention is sharply directed to the extent that the
movement for uniformity of laws through legislation has been success-
ful in New York and many other states."49
Repression of Opinion. When proponents of radical change are
confronted with a statute which, if upheld and broadly interpreted,
denies them the opportunity to express themselves, a dilemma is pre-
sented to a liberal judge. His tendency to interpret broadly, and to
uphold, changes which the legislature has made in our legal situation,,
is opposed by his tendency to protect unprivileged persons and the
free advocacy of further change. With Pound the latter sort of ten-
dency seems to have predominated. In People ex rel. Doyle v. Atwell5"
defendants had violated a municipal ordinance which forbade street
meetings without a permit from the mayor. They had first applied for
a permit, which had been refused expressly because they were Social-
ists. Held for trial in a magistrate's court, their petition for habeas
corpus was denied. The Court of Appeals affirmed this denial, holding
the municipal ordinance constitutional and ruling that if the mayor
had abused his discretion the defendants should have sought redress
in the courts instead of holding their meeting in defiance of the law.
Even Judge Cardozo concurred in the result. Pound alone dissented.
44224 N. Y. 497. Cf. (1917) 2 CORNELL L. Q. 209, (1919) 4 Id. 6o.
45244 M.] Y. 33, 154 N. E. 655 (1926).
46224 N. Y. 528, 121 N. E. 364 (1918).
4720 Johns. 636 (N. Y. 1822).
48187 N. Y. 115, 120, 79 N. E. 857 (1907).
49Kelso v. Ellis, supra note 46, at 536, 537.
'232 N. Y. 96, 133 N. E. 364 (1921).
POUND: A LIBERAL JUDGE
He held the ordinance unconstitutional, relying on Yick Wo v. Hop-
kins,5 ' where the United States Supreme Court had held that the
constitutionality of a statute might be determined by the manner in
which it is enforced: if its administration is directed against a certain
group, the statute, though valid on its face, becomes void. "The Yick
Wo case was one of discrimination against the Chinese; the case be-
fore us is one of discrimination against the Socialists. The California
ordinance may have been conceived in iniquity, while the Mt. Vernon
ordinance was enacted before it became customary to adopt repres-
sive measures against the Socialists, but if the unconstitutional pur-
pose is the test no distinction is made between the enactment and the
enforcement... The people are not to be lawfully deprived of their
free customs and privileges by the mere will of the magistrate .. .
The presumption is that discretionary power will not be arbitrarily
exercised but when it is so exercised the Supreme Court of the United
States has not hesitated to hold that it will protect the individuals
thus oppressed.
'52
In People v. GitloZ53 defendants were imprisoned for advocating
"Left Wing" socialism, under a statute which made it a crime to
advocate anarchy and defined anarchy as the doctrine that organized
government should be overthrown by violence. The defendants ad-
vocated revolution by direct rather than constitutional means, and the
"dictatorship of the proletariat" brought about by the mass strike.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. Pound dissented, and
with him Cardozo concurred. The statute, Pound pointed out, was
passed after the assassination of McKinley and was aimed at anarch-
ism, which was then widely advocated in Europe. Anarchism means
the absence of any supreme power in the state. As such it is the antith-
esis of an organized proletarian dictatorship, and a statute aimed
at the one should not be applied to the other. Pound had no liking
for Left Wing socialism; he called it a "pretentious and vicious pro-
gram glibly advocated." An actual attempt to set up such a govern-
ment, he conceded, would be unlawful, but he found "nothing in our
statute which makes it a crime to teach such revolutionary doctrines
and advocate such a change in our form of government".5 4 The de-
cision of the majority of the Court of Appeals in People v. Gitlow
was affirmed by the United States Supreme Court. Justices Holmes
and Brandeis dissented; not on the ground taken by Pound and Car-
51118 U. S. 356, 6 Sup. Ct. io64 (i886).
52232 N. Y. 96, I05, 107, 133 N. E. 364, 367, 368 (1921).
53234 N. Y. 132, 136 N. E. 317 (1922); aff'd. 268 U. S. 652, 45 Sup. Ct. 625
(1925).
4234 N. Y. 132, 157, 158, x36 N. E. 317, 327 (1922).
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dozo, but on the ground that the statute as applied to the acts of the
defendant was in conflict with the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, since "there was no present danger of an attempt to
overthrow the government by force on the part of the admittedly small
minority who shared the defendant's views." 5
III. JUDGE POUND AND THE UNPRIVILEGED
Since radical propagandists are unpopular and unprivileged per-
sons, Pound's opinions adverse to their repression, which have just
been discussed as examples of his tolerance toward change, also il-
lustrate his care for the unprivileged. Other unprivileged groups for
whose interests he showed concern may be roughly differentiated
under the heads of married women, workingmen, foreigners, the un-
conventional, criminals, and the "public".
Married Women. In cases involving the interests of married wo-
men, Pound tended strongly to interpret the law so as to allow them
the fullest independence and equality with men. His first opinion in
the Court of Appeals, in Matter of Goodrich v. Village of Otego,5 6
dealt with rights under the Married Women's Property Acts. In this
case a husband and wife were tenants by the entirety. The husband
sued for injury to the land by a change in street grade, and recovered
below as owner in fee. Reversing, Pound pointed out that the effect
of the Married Women's Property Acts was to make tenants by the
entirety tenants in common with equal rights. A husband who sued
alone could recover only for the diminution in value of his own
estate.
When it came to allowing a married woman a right of action against
her husband for a personal tort, the rest of the Court of Appeals
was not willing to go along with Pound. In Allen v. Allen,57 an action
for malicious prosecution, the court, including Chief Judge Cardozo,
without opinion, denied the wife a remedy on the authority of Schultz
v. Schultz, "8 decided in 1882. Pound and Andrews alone dissented. In
an exhaustive opinion, Pound pointed out that the Schultz case had
been decided before the passage of section 57 of the Domestic Rela-
tions Law, which expressly allows a married woman a right of action
"for an injury to her person, property or character . . . as if un-
married." This he thought, in conjunction with the Married Women's
Property Acts, showed an intent to do away with all restrictions
5'Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652, 673, 45 Sup. Ct. 625, 632 (1925).
5216 N. Y. 112, ino N. E. 162 (1915).
57246 N. Y. 571, 159 N. E. 656 (1927).
5889 N. Y. 644 (1882).
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on married women's rights. "When the wife is given in law, as in
fact, an existence separate from her husband for all other purposes,
the courts should not, by speculating on the legislative intent, remerge
her being into that of her husband and assume a legal unity of husband
and wife to exist for the single purpose of protecting him when he
injures her person without right."5 9 "Immunity is barbarous. '60
Another case involving the position of women under modern stat-
utes is Matter of Thorne.61 A husband had obtained a decree of di-
vorce, and had been awarded custody of a child on the ground that
the mother was unfit to be entrusted with it. The husband then died,
in Duchess County, and the surrogate of that county appointed guard-
ians for the infant without citing the mother, who was domiciled in
New York County. The mother moved to have this appointment
vacated. In a four to three decision in which Judge Cardozo con-
curred, Pound affirmed an order granting the mother's motion. He
took the position that while in former times only the father's domicile
mattered, because the headship of the family was in him alone, in
modem times when the father dies the child takes its mother's domi-
cile. The divorce decree merely decided custody as between husband
and wife, and had no effect after the husband's death. The surrogate
might in his discretion appoint some one else as guardian, but that
fact did not prevent the child's domicile from being that of its mother,
or confer jurisdiction upon the courts of the county where the child's
father died. "The dilemma, it would seem, is this: Shall she be ignored
as an outcast or recognized as a mother ?" 6 2
Burritt v. Burritt,6 3 a case which Pound decided as a trial judge as
early as 1907, was a divorce action brought by a wife. The referee
bad found in favor of the plaintiff, but had awarded the three children
of the parties to the adulterous defendant because of minor uncon-
ventionalities on the plaintiff's part. Pound agreed with the referee
as to divorce but disagreed with him as to custody. This created a
dilemma, for the court had, as Pound observed, "power only to con-
firm or to refuse to confirm the referee's report". He proceeded to
do neither. His opinion concludes: "The report is confirmed and
judgment ordered in accordance therewith, but with leave to the plain-
tiff to apply... for a modification of the judgment herein as far as
relates to the custody of said children and allowance for their support.
Meanwhile, let the execution of judgment be stayed, so far as it
59246 N. Y. 571, 581, 159 N. E. 656, 660 (1927).
'Old. at 584, 159 N. E. at 661.
61240 N. Y. 444, 148 N. E. 630 (1925).
6Id. at 449, 148 N. E. at 631.
653 Misc. 24, 25, 102 N. Y. Supp. 475 (Sup. Ct. 19o7).
36 CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
awards custody of the children to the defendant." It required the
ingenuity and courage of a "strong" judge, as well as a regard for
the interests of the mother and her children, thus to "keep the word
of promise to the ear and break it to the hope."
Judge Pound not only insisted on independence for married women,
but tended to accord them a special degree of protection, when they
seemed to stand in need of it, against unkind or unfair treatment. In
Hofnann v. Hofmann,64 the plaintiff's husband had secured an invalid
divorce in a foreign jurisdiction and had thereupon purported to re-
marry, and had informed various people, including the plaintiff's
children, of the pretended divorce and re-marriage. Pound held this
sufficient to support a charge of cruelty in an action for separation.
While adultery is not ordinarily cruelty, he said, it may be if it is
"open and notorious, flaunted in the eyes of the public or dragged into
the presence of the blameless wife or husband. ' 65 In spite of this
express inclusion of both spouses, it may be questioned whether, if
the shoe had been on the other foot, a wife's invalid divorce and re-
marriage would have been considered "cruelty" to a husband. In
Farnham v. Farnham,6 disappointed relatives sought to annul defen-
dant's marriage with her deceased husband so that they might obtain
her share of the property. The majority of the court, including Judge
Cardozo, refused defendant an allowance for alimony pendente lite
and for counsel fees, because she was not being sued by her husband.
Pound and Chase, JJ. dissented. Pound conceded that the defendant
had no right to alimony, because the plaintiffs owed her no duty of
support, but he thought that counsel fees should be allowed. "On
general principles of equity, the court should have power to require
those who seek to annul a marriage for their pecuniary gain to pay
such sums as may be necessary to enable the wife to conduct her de-
fense."'67 It was not suggested that a husband would have been en-
titled, in a like case, to the same protection. In Scheinberg v. Schein-
berg,68 after a wife had obtained a separation from her husband, he
caused three distinct suits to be brought against her, one to impress
a trust in his favor upon certain land, one to foreclose a mortgage
which he had formerly persuaded her to take out for his convenience,
and one to throw her into bankruptcy. While she was in danger of
losing her property in any one of these proceedings, and without funds
to support herself or to pay lawyers, she agreed that if he would stop
4232 N. Y. 215, 133 N. E. 450 (1921).
65Id. at 218, 133 N. E. at 451.
'227 N. Y. 155, 124 N. E. 894 (1919).
671d. at x61, 124 N. E. at 895.
68249 N. Y. 277, 164 N. E. 98 (1928).
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the proceedings against her she would sell him the property at a price
which was less than half its value. He obtained a decree for specific
performance of this agreement in the lower courts, but Pound, ob-
serving that "the taint of coercion and fraud infects the whole trans-
action,"'6 9 reversed. "Courts of equity refuse to enforce harsh and
unfair bargains... If one party acts unfairly and the other yields to
the pressure of circumstances, equity will refuse specific performance
even though in law the contract would be enforced." 70
Workingmen. Pound wrote various opinions favorable to the inter-
ests of workingmen where those interests conflicted, or appeared to
conflict, with the interests of employers. His leadership in sustaining
the validity of the worknen's compensation acts, and his tendency to
interpret those acts and similar acts liberally, have been discussed. 71 In
Stillwell Theatre, Inc. v. Kaplan,72 the defendants peacefully picketed
the plaintiff's theatres with a sign bearing the true statement, "Owners
of this theatre refuse to employ members of Motion Picture Operators
Union Local 3o6, affiliated with the American Federation of Labor." 73
The plaintiff corporation had contracted with a rival union to employ
its members. The lower courts, which had ordered the defendants to
cease displaying these signs, were reversed in an opinion from which
only one judge dissented. For the court, Pound said: "To state fairly
and truly to the public that the conduct of the employer is socially
objectionable to a labor union is no persuasion to break a contract." 74
"The interests of capital and labor are at times inimical and the courts
may not decide controversies between the parties so long as neither
resorts to violence, deceit or misrepresentation to bring about desired
results. '75 The decision is important, as it obviates the possibility of
an employer's using a contract with a company union as a basis for
restraining the activities of a real union.76 .
In cases involving negligence, Pound frequently expressed dissatis-
faction with the readiness of trial courts to find injured workmen 77
guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. He held that an
employee who fell through an open hatch in the dimly lighted hold of
a ship was not as a matter of law contributorily negligent in failing
19ld. at 283, 164 N. E. at 99.
7 81d. at 281, 282, 164 N. E. at 99.
71Supra, p. 22, 29.
2.59 N. Y. 405, 182 N. E. 63 (1932).
73Id. at 4o8, 182 N. E. at 64.
1Id. at 412, 182 N. E. at 66.
7651d. at 41O, 182 N. E. at 65.
76(1932) 46 HARv. L. REV. 131.
170r highway travelers; see p. 42, infra.
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to have adequate light, when the place was unfamiliar to him and he
had received no warning of its danger ;78 nor was a linesman neces-
sarily negligent when he touched with his bare hand a telephone wire
which he was repairing and received a fatal shock because it had come
into contact with fallen electric light wires. 79 "Ordinary prudence re-
mains the test of reasonable care and all the burden cannot be placed
upon the employee by general rules requiring him to look out for
himself, when.. . nothing was done by the employer to enforce com-
pliance with the rule which required rubber gloves to be used ... and
there is evidence tending to show that the rule was not understood
to apply to such work. . . "s In each of these cases Pound spoke for
the majority of a divided court which reversed the Appellate Division.
Foreigners and Foreign Governments. Foreign individuals and gov-
ernments were apt to find Pound on their side. In Matter of Lendle,8 1
the Appellate Division had held that a legacy expressed in marks, and
payable to the German relatives of the American testator, should be
computed at the rate of exchange which prevailed on the day of the
execution of the will, when the mark was paper and was worth $.o153.
Pound and the Court of Appeals held that it was payable "in marks
which pass as such in the market at the time the legacies are paid".
Although the testator could hardly'have foreseen it, the gold mark had
by that time been restored, and the reversal gave the German relatives
$112,000 instead of $7,000. In Johnston v. Coinpagnie Gin~rale
Transatlantique,8 2 Pound held that the judgment of a French court,
unless impeached for fraud, was conclusive between the parties, not-
withstanding the facts that a French court in a converse case would
examine the merits and that the United States Supreme Court had
retaliated, in the name of comity, by holding that a French judgment
was no more than prima facie evidence of the validity of a claim.
Pound wrote one dissenting opinion and one opinion of the court
in cases which involved acts of the Soviet government and were de-
cided before the American recognition of the Soviets. In First Rus-
sian Insurance Co. v. Beha, Supt. of Insurance,8 3 the question was
whether funds deposited by a Russian insurance corporation with the
New York State Superintendent of Insurance could be recovered in
the name of the corporation after all its assets had been sequestrated
by a Soviet decree. In a per curiam opinion in which Judge Cardozo
78Seyford v. Southern Pacific Co., 216 N. Y. 613, In N. E. 248 (1916).
7"Larkin v. New York Telephone Co., 220 N. Y. 27, 114 N. E. 1043 (1917).
80 d. at 32, 114 N. E. at io45.
8125o N. Y. 502, 5o6, 507, 166 N. E. 182 (1929).
82242 N. Y. 381, 152 N. E. 121 (1926).
%3240 N. Y. 601, 148 N. E. 722 (1925).
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concurred, the Court of Appeals allowed recovery. Pound alone dis-
sented.8 4 He pointed out that the Insurance Law provides that when
a foreign corporation having assets in this state has "had its property
sequestrated in its domiciliary state or country", the superintendent
of insurance may apply for an order permitting him to conserve its
assets for the benefit of its creditors. "Without recognizing the Soviet
decrees, we must recognize the resulting facts. It is as if the Soviet
government had decreed the death of A and A had been executed. If
he had been a citizen of New York we might say that he was mur-
dered, but none the less we would proceed to administer his estate.
We would deal with the fact and ignore the cause." 85 "We should
not lose sight of future consequences nor should the Russian com-
panies, in their equivocal position of being corporations to enforce
their claims and nul tiel corporations when sued, be dealt with too
indulgently in our courts."86 In Salimoff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co..,8 7
the Court of Appeals unanimously recognized the effectiveness of the
Soviet confiscation of Russian oil lands formerly owned by the Sali-
moffs, and the sale of oil from the lands to the Standard Oil Company,
by holding that the plaintiffs could not compel the defendant to ac-
count. This time Pound wrote the court's opinion. He observed that
the United States government had recognized the existence of the
Soviet government "as a fact although it has refused diplomatic recog-
nition as one might refuse to recognize an objectionable relative al-
though his actual existence could not be denied."8 8 Of the court's
decision in the Russian Insurance Company case and another, Pound
said: "We have reached the conclusion in those and similar cases
that such decrees had no extraterritorial effect and that the continued
existence of such companies, wherever they were found to function
outside of Russia, would be recognized. The consequence has been
that corporations non-existent in Russia have been, like fugitive
ghosts endowed with extraterritorial immortality, recognized as exist-
ing outside its boundaries. The juristic person, the Russian corpora-
tion, dead in the country which created it, has received juridical vivifi-
cation elsewhere."89 Although Pound courteously said that "In this
case another situation is presented",9 0 it is apparent that his own
attitude in the two cases was consisten. He recognized the same fac-
8 4MeLaughlin and Andrews, JJ., not sitting.
$51d. at 602, 603, 148 N. E. at 723.
8id. at 604, 148 N. E. at 723.
87262 N. Y. 220, 186 N. E. 679 (I933).
'
81d. at 226, x86 N. E. at 682.
89Md. at 225, 226, 186 N. E. at 681, 682.
901d. at 226, 186 N. E. at 682.
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tual force in Soviet action when it tended to enrich the New York
State Department of Insurance as when it enriched the Standard Oil
Company.
The Unconventional. In Matter of Schwarz v. Association of the
Bar,91 the court held it proper to disbar an attorney who sent circular
letters to former clients soliciting further patronage of his collection
agency. The attorney's conduct in so doing contravened a rule of
propriety which lawyers as a group have found it pleasant and profit-
able, and perhaps useful to the public, to set up; and it happens that
lawyers call their rules of propriety "ethics", regardless of the presence
or absence of ethical content. Pound vigorously dissented. In an
opinion in which Judge Hiscock and Judge Cardozo joined, he argued
that "Disbarment not only deprives the attorney of his livelihood, but
casts him out a pariah in the community", and that the rules included
in professional Codes of Ethics "which do not involve the distinction
between natural right and wrong should not be too strictly applied
against one whose sin has been against good taste rather than good
morals." In a later case involving unconventional conduct of another
sort, which was decided after Judge Hiscock's retirement, the court
again divided four to three, but this time Pound and Cardozo were
joined by Lehman and Kellogg, and Pound spoke for the court. The
defendants in People v. Wendling,92 who had dramatized what Pound
referred to as "the ancient folk song, 'Frankie and Johnnie' ", were
convicted of presenting an indecent play "which would tend to the
corruption of the morals of youth or others." The Court of Appeals
reversed the conviction. Pound conceded that the play was "'indecent'
from every consideration of propriety"; but a conviction, he pointed
out, was not justified unless the play tended to corrupt morals. "The
court is not a censor of plays and does not attempt to regulate man-
ners ... Prostitutes are not so rarely represented on the stage as to
arouse the sexual propensities of the spectators whenever they appear
... The Bible talks bluntly of harlots and whores but it does not incite
to immorality." 93 "The fact that Frankie and Johnnie and their com-
panions were not nice people does not in itself make the play ob-
scene." 94 Pound took evident pleasure in his result and his argument.
In a footnote he gravely referred the reader to "Dr. Sigmund Spaeth,
'Read 'em and weep-The Songs You Forgot to Remember' ". But
his sense of the respect due to legislatures and juries placed him
912 3 1 N. Y. 642, 644, 645, 132 N. E. 921, 922, 923 (1921).
9258 N. Y. 451, i8o N. E. 169 (1932).
93Id. at 453, 18o N. E. at 169.
9Id. at 455, i8o N. E. at 170.
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among the majority when a divided court sustained a conviction for
possessing Schnitzler's "Reigen" on the theory that it was an indecent
book.95
Criminals. Pound felt strongly on the subject of the "third degree". 95a
In People v. Barbato,96 in reversing a conviction because an extorted
confession was admitted in evidence, he said: "Lawless methods of
law enforcement should not be countenanced by our courts even
though they may seem expedient to the authorities in order to ap-
prehend the guilty. Whether a guilty man goes free or not is a small
matter compared with the maintenance of principles which still safe-
guard a person accused of crime. If torture is to be accepted as a
means of securing confessions, let us have no pretense about it but
repeal section 395 of the Code of Criminal Procedure . . . "97 But
Pound was not inclined to reverse unless there was room to believe
that the extorted confession might have influenced the conviction. In
People v. Trybus9s there was adequate evidence, including eyewitness
testimony and unimpeached confessions, of the defendant's guilt of
first degree murder. The earliest confessions had been obtained while
the defendant was under illegal restraint, and was being abused by
private detectives. Pound wrote the opinion of the court which sus-
tained the conviction. "The conduct of a detective in needlessly laying
hands on a helpless man detained by him without legal warrant de-
serves the severest censure. The practice of detectives to take in cus-
tody and hold in durance persons merely suspected of crime in order
to obtain statements from them before formal complaint and arraign-
ment, and before they can see friends and counsel, is without legal
sanction." 99 But "defendant himself does not claim that all his state-
ments were involuntary or inspired by hope or fear. In fact, he wholly
fails to testify that he made any of the statements because he was in
fear or because he was promised partial immunity."'. .
A case involving the interests of ex-convicts is Derrick v. Wallace.2
The plaintiff in a civil action admitted, on cross-examination, his con-
viction many years before of the crime of forgery. Pound, again speak-
ing for the court, held that he should then have been permitted to
introduce evidence of his general good reputation in his community.
"Is he to be discredited for life rather than permitted to call witnesses
to his present good character ?"3
95People v. Pesky, 254 N. Y. 373, 173 N. E. 227 (1930).
"gaCf. Pound's article, Inquisitorial Confessions (1915) i CORNELL L. Q. 77.
"'254 N. Y. 170, 172 N. E. 458 (1930).
971d. at 178, 172 N. E. at 461. 9"2I9 N. Y. I8, 113 N. E. 538 (1916).
99Id. at 22, 113 N. E. at 539, 540. 'Id. at 23, 113 N. E. at 54o .
'217 N. Y. 520, 112 N. E. 44o (r916). 3Id. at 524, 112 N. E. at 441.
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The "Public". Many controversies no party to which is obviously
a member of an unprivileged group nevertheless involve a fairly clear
conflict between the interests of the more fortunate minority and of
the less fortunate majority. Here again Pound was usually on the side
of the unprivileged. His limited sympathy with "business" interests
has been noted.- His tendency to uphold the constitutionality of stat-
utes taxing corporate income,5 and to interpret such statutes broadly,"
was at the same time a tendency toward letting the burdens of taxation
fall upon the prosperous. In sustaining emergency legislation of vari-
ous types,1 he protected the interests of tenants of residence property
as against landlords, and of farmers and consumers of milk as against
middlemen.
In cases arising out of highway accidents, as in the cases involving
work accidents," Pound was relatively reluctant to discover contribu-
tory negligence. When a majority of the court held a foot-passenger
contributorily negligent as a matter of law for crossing a Bronx street,
as Pound expressed it, "without waiting for the procession to pass
by," and thirty feet in front of a moving street car, Pound wrote a
dissenting opinion to the effect that "this standard of dangerous near-
ness may do for the leisurely life of rural communities, but" not "in
the rush of city life."9 In a case where a traveler had looked in both
directions and had then driven his horse and buggy upon railroad
tracks where he was struck by a train which approached without
warning, the whole court agreed with Pound that it was error to hold
the traveler contributorily negligent as a matter of law on the ground
that by greater care he might have avoided the accident.10 "It is not
the law," he said, "that as a distinct and conclusive circumstance, one
must assume that no warning of the approach of trains will be given
and relax in no degree his vigilance although silence suggests security,
and it is not the law that one who has once looked from a proper view-
point must, at his peril, look again before proceeding."1'
Repeatedly Pound's voice and vote supported the interests, actual
4See p. 20, supra.
TPeople ex rel. Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Knapp, supra p. 24.6People ex rel. Wedgewood Realty Co., Inc., v. Lynch, supra p. 3L.
7See p. 27, supra. 3See P. 37, suPra.
9McGuire v. New York Railways Co., 23o N. Y. 23, 29, 128 N. E. 905, 907
(1920).
10Carr v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 225 N. Y. 44, 121 N. R. 473 (1918).
hid. at 47, 121 N. E. at 474.
Pound repudiated the familiar sentiment that to give a negligence case to a
jury is to favor an impecunious plaintiff over a corporation defendant. "The
tradition that juries invariably find against a corporation defendant if given
the opportunity to decide the question of fact is obsolescent if not obsolete."
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or apparent, of consumers and the general public in conflicts with
public utilities and concerns which claimed that character. In Matter
of Quinby v. Public Service Commission,12 he spoke for the majority
of the court in holding, contrary to the usual opinion, that a general
delegation to a state commission of power to regulate rates did not
carry with it the power to raise street-car fares which had been agreed
upon between the utility and a municipality.'3 In Matter of Inter-
national Railway Co. v. Rann,14 again speaking for a court which was
not unanimous, he held that a proyision in a city charter requiring
a referendum on any resolution of the council "disposing of any prop-
erty or rights of the city" was applicable to a resolution by which the
city council undertook to consent to an increase in street-car fares
beyond the contract rate of five cents; although the principal benefit
of the existing contract obviously accrued not to "the city" but to its
inhabitants. In- Holmes Electric Protective Co, v. Williams,15 Pound
and Cardozo dissented from a decision which recognized as a "tele-
graph company", entitled to occupy the streets of New York with its
wires, a concern which performed no services for the general public
and transmitted no messages, but merely supplied a burglar-alarm
system and watchmen to its subscribers by private contract. In City
of Rochester v. Rochester Gas & Electric Corporation,'1 Pound alone
dissented from a decision which upheld a "service charge", to con-
sumers of gas, of forty cents per month. He held that the charge was
objectionable both as an indirect violation of a statute which pro-
hibited the collection of rent for meters, and as a discrimination; "A
uniform compensation for service is provided when the service to
consumers is unequal".
In upholding the power to spend public money for a soldiers'
bonus,' 7 and for the compensation of an individual accidentally
wounded by a public officer,' 8 Pound protected the interests of the
average man as against the state or the municipality. The same is true
12223 N. Y. 244, 119 N. E. 433 (I918).
13Some of the subsequent vicissitudes of this doctrine are reviewed in Village
of Mamaroneck v. Public Service Commission, 2o8 App. Div. 330, 2o3 N. Y.
Supp. 678 (3rd Dept. 1924), aJJ'd. 238 N. Y. 588, 144 N. E. 5o3 (1924), and in
Matter of United Traction Co. v. Public Service Commission, 219 App. Div.
95, 219 N. Y. Supp. 421 (3rd Dept. 1927).
1'224 N. Y. 83, 85, 12o N. E. 153 (1918).
15228 N. Y. 407, 127 N. E. 315 (1920).
1233 N. Y. 39, 54, 134 N. E. 828, 834 (1922).
"7People v. Westchester County National Bank, 231 N. Y. 465, 132 N. E.
241 (1921), supra p. 26.
"sMatter of Evans v. Berry, 262 N. Y. 6r, 186 N. E. 203 (1933), supra p. 26.
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of the cases in which he took a broad view of the right of recovery
against a municipal corporation for negligent injury.19
IV. THE GREATNESS OF JUDGE POUND
Dean Roscoe Pound has recently told us that four characteristics
have caused Justice Cardozo and nine earlier American judges to be
"rated in the first rank."20 The Dean's "list of our greatest judges"
does not include his kinsman, Judge Pound. I can not undertake
comparison between Judge Pound and John Bannister Gibson,
Thomas Ruffin, or Charles Doe, each of whom is on Dean Pound's
list. But no one can read Judge Pound's opinions without knowing
that he was a great judge. Dean Pound finds that the "first ten"
American judges had four characteristics in common: (i) mastery of
the lawyer's craft, (2) coincidence in time with a formative legal era,
(3) sound judicial technic and sound judgment and discretion in
expounding, interpreting and applying the law, and (4) legal scholar-
ship. judge Pound was a great judge by these criteria, and also by
criteria to which Dean Pound does not advert.
He had, in the first place, a varied knowledge and understanding
of life, an extraordinary versatility in grasping the background and
meaning of the diverse problems, whether domestic, commercial, or
social, which came before his court.21 In the second place, as appellate
judges do their work with words, their accomplishment depends in
large degree upon the effectiveness with which they use words. Judge
Pound's judicial style is seldom equaled. It is neither severe nor or-
nate. In terms of the old text-book trilogy of "clearness, force and
beauty", the important qualities for judicial writing are clearness and
force, that the reader may see what is meant and, if possible, be brought
to assent to it. It is for clearness and force that Judge Pound's style is
conspicuous. No "purple patches" divert attention from the matter
in hand to the merits or demerits of the author's manner. Such beauty
as there is is not introduced for its own sake; it is incidental to con-
ciseness and vigor. The most ornamental feature of his style is a cer-
tain pungency. "The preceding fifty-four pages of the opinion may be
regarded as magnificent dictum, entitled to the utmost respect, but
not determinative of the question."22 "An historical justification of
19See p. 18, supra.
2
°POLLARD, MR. JUSTICE CARDozo, A LIBERAL MIND IN AcTIoN (1935); fore-
word by Roscoe Pound.
2"Perhaps something of this quality is implicit in the "judgment" and "dis-
cretion" of Dean Pound's third criterion.
2Johnston v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 242 N. Y. 381, 388, 152
N. E. 121, 123 (1926).
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liberty of contract between landlord and tenant is not a demonstration
that the system must survive every exigency."23 "Aquiescence will
not be inferred from the silence of the dead."'24 "Secret societies have,
in the past, been recognized as meeting a desire of many of our citi-
zens to band themselves together by oaths more horrific than ,harm-
ful."' 2 5 "If the litigants lose, the law is enriched by another prece-
dent."26
Finally, a judge's performance depends not only upon his skill in
reaching and expressing desired (or other) results, but also upon the
character of the results which he desires. As judging is not a purely
intellectual process, as a judge's emotions and point of view give
direction to his work, they should not be forgotten when his work is
evaluated. Judge Learned Hand, in discussing Mr. Justice Holmes,
has said that "in the end, and quite fairly, a judge will be estimated
in terms of his outlook and his nature. '2 7 Judge Pound was eminent
in his tolerance toward statutes, judicial legislation, and change. He
was close to preeminence in his ability to differentiate between the
interests of the privileged class to which judges belong and the inter-
ests of society, in his prevailing impulse to protect the interests of the
unprivileged.
23People ex rel. Durham Realty Corp. v. La Fetra, 23o N. Y. 429, 446, 130
N. E. 6oi, 607 (1921).2
'Nankivel v. Omsk All Russian Government, 237 N. Y. 150, 158, 142 N. E.
569, 571 (1923).
25People v. Zimmerman, 241 N. Y. 405, 409, 15o N. E. 497, 498 (1926).
EMatter of Crouse, 244 N. Y. 400, 403, 155 N. E. 685, 686 (1927).
raIn MR. JUsTIcE HOLMES, ed. by Felix Frankfurter (193), p. 122, 123.
